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A B S T R A C T
During the 17 years that Vladimir Putin has ruled Russia, the country has become increas-
ingly authoritarian. However, I argue that this rollback of democracy has not been motivated
by Putin’s blind desire to maximize his political power, as many have assumed. Rather, his
anti-democratic policies have responded to perceived speciﬁc threats to his control. In
applying theories originally developed in the ﬁeld of international relations to individual
leaders, we can understand Putin as a “defensive realist” who balances against threats in
order to maintain security rather than maximize power. This is an essential distinction
that produces important conclusions about what motives lie behind the increasingly au-
thoritarian character of the Russian state and gives insights into the possible future trajectory
of the regime.
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1. Introduction
The anti-democratic policies and reforms of Vladimir
Putin during the years he served as Russia’s president (2000–
2008, 2012–present) and as PrimeMinister (2008–2012) are
well known. Efforts aimed at silencing independent media,
jailing and legal harassment of outspoken oligarchs, elim-
ination of gubernatorial elections, and raising barriers to
opposition political parties characterized the early years of
Putin’s rule. The mid- to late-2000s witnessed increasing
manipulation of electoral processes in order to produce fa-
vorable outcomes for Putin and the party of power, United
Russia. Not until the mass protests that spread through
Russian cities following the questionable Duma and pres-
idential elections of 2011–2012 did Putin initiate a
signiﬁcant crackdown on ordinary citizen political activism.
Tomany observers and scholars of Russian politics, Putin’s
efforts have been a constant and deliberate process of deep-
ening authoritarian rule in Russia, concentrating ever more
political power in the Kremlin. Such a narrative is often
paired with the assumption – explicit or otherwise – that
Putin’s goal (whether for personal or institutional reasons)
is to maximize his political power as head of the Russian
state. Thus, the gradual attack on democratic institutions
and individual liberties in Russia has come at the hands of
a power-hungry dictator who always seeksmore for himself.
This line of reasoning resonates at the domestic level with
theories developed in International Relations to describe the
behavior of states: “offensive realism” argues that great
powers seek to acquire as much power in the internation-
al system as possible in order to promote their security. A
domestic “offensive realist” explanation of Putin’s authori-
tarianism would argue the same.
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However, in international relations theory there is
another school of thought, that of the “defensive realists”
who argue that states seek not tomaximize power but rather
to maximize their security. The goal of states in the inter-
national system, according to defensive realists, is to ensure
their security and survival, an objective that may actually
be undermined if they seek too much power and provoke
a backlash. “Balance of threat theory,” ﬁrst developed by
Stephen Walt, is an example of the defensive realist school
of thought. Walt argues that states take action to counter
threats to their security, with threat level determined by four
characteristics of a possible rival state: 1) Aggregate power;
2) Offensive power; 3) Proximate power; and 4) Offensive
intentions. To the defensive realist operating according to
balance of threat logic, the threat to state security comes
ﬁrst and is followed by a counterbalancing reaction. This
contrasts with the offensive realist assertion that great
powers are primarily assertive – not reactive – in efforts to
expand their power.
I argue the application of insights from these IR theo-
ries to the domestic political power calculations of Vladimir
Putin’s regime can produce important insights into the logic
and trajectory of Russia’s authoritarian development. By
properly understanding Putin as a “domestic defensive
realist” who seeks ﬁrst and foremost to maintain and secure
his domestic power, we can understand his anti-democratic
policies in a new light. A careful analysis of several epi-
sodes throughout Putin’s rule will reveal that his policies
– while undoubtedly authoritarian – are not examples of
a power-hungry dictator expanding his control as widely
and deeply as possible. Rather, they aremore accurately seen
as reactions to threats that have arisen to his political control
and security.
This conclusion – that Putin “balances” in reaction to do-
mestic threats – leads to some troubling and surprising
conclusions: Vladimir Putin’s actions suggest a deep sense
insecurity which has led to a nearly obsessive counterrevo-
lutionary focus on ever-emerging threats to his political
survival. These threats have often been concentrated around
electoral cycles in Russia and – importantly – in Russia’s
neighbors as well. This leads to a prediction that Russia will
continue its authoritarian ratcheting under Putin and that
the next rounds of elections in Russia are likely to be the
most oppressed in Rusisa’s post-Soviet history.
2. Putin’s authoritarian march
There can be no question that since coming to power in
2000, Vladimir Putin has overseen the transformation of
Russia from a semi-democracy to an exemplar of “compet-
itive authoritarianism” (Levitsky & Way, 2010). The causes
of that transition are multiple and they are complex; the
present endeavor does not afford the opportunity to explore
the full spectrum of causes of Russia’s authoritarian tra-
jectory. However, there is no doubt that Putin himself has
been a key driving force behind Russia’s increasingly au-
tocratic regime. The general outlines of Russia’s political
development under Putin is readily apparent in Figures 1
and 2, which display Russia’s compiled scores from Freedom
House’sNations in Transit (NIT) reports (Orttung, 2009, 2014).
The Nations in Transit reports evaluate, rate, and discuss a
country’s progress toward or away from democracy along
several dimensions of liberal democracy, as well as a com-
posite “democracy score” (Fig. 1) that combines the ratings
in each subcategory. The Freedom House scale ranges
from 1 (consolidated democracy) to 7 (consolidated
Fig. 1. Freedom House “Nations in Transit” scores – Russia.
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authoritarian).1 These ﬁgures show what Russia watchers
have long known – that Russia has become increasingly au-
tocratic over the duration of Putin’s rule. This transformation
has taken place in all realms of political life as the state has
centralized and strengthened its power at the expense of
any possible independent loci of political power. To use the
terminology of Tsebelis (2002), the Kremlin under Vladi-
mir Putin has eliminated or severely weakened both formal
and informal veto players who might have been in a posi-
tion to challenge its policies.
Experts in the academic, policy, and media spheres have
rightly placed a hefty share of the blame for Russia’s re-
version to authoritarianism on Putin himself as he has
transformed the institutional attributes of the Russian
regime. The dominant narrative among western Russia ana-
lysts has been that Putin’s reauthoritarianization of Russia
has been part of a deliberate effort to extend his control over
Russian political, economic, and social life. In this narra-
tive, Putin is the power-hungry autocrat with a ever-
expanding appetite for political power. In other words, he
is a power maximizer – the more, the better.
Such interpretations of Putin’s underlying motivations
appear in a variety of scholarly analyses from his ﬁrst pres-
idency (2000–2008) as well as his current term as president
(2012–present). In an inﬂuential 2008 Foreign Affairs article
by (one day U.S. Ambassador to Russia) Michael McFaul and
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, the authors narrate Russia’s author-
itarian slide throughout the 2000s (McFaul & Stoner-Weiss,
2008). Tellingly, the article’s subtitle is “How Putin’s Crack-
down Holds Russia Back.” Throughout the piece the authors
describe the various assaults on the independent media, the
judiciary, regional governments, the parliament, and NGOs.
At various points this is described as “Putin’s autocratic turn”
(69); “Putin’s rollback of democracy” (70); “the Kremlin[’s
extension of] its reach” to media (70); Putin’s “emascula-
[tion of] the Federation Council” (71); and other similar
descriptors. In the 2007 Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture on
1 See the NIT methodology article for a detailed description of the meth-
odologies used to generate country ratings and reports. Subcategory ratings
consider the following: “National Democratic Governance considers the
democratic character and stability of the governmental system; the in-
dependence, effectiveness, and accountability of legislative and executive
branches; and the democratic oversight of military and security ser-
vices. Electoral process examines national executive and legislative
elections, electoral processes, the development of multiparty systems, and
popular participation in the political process. Civil society assesses the
growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational ca-
pacity and ﬁnancial sustainability, and the legal and political environment
in which they function; the development of free trade unions; and inter-
est group participation in the policy process. Independent media address
the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of jour-
nalists, and editorial independence; the emergence of a ﬁnancially viable
private press; and internet access for private citizens. Local democratic
governance considers the decentralization of power; the responsibili-
ties, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the
transparency and accountability of local authorities. Judicial frame-
work and independence highlights constitutional reform, human rights
protections, criminal code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic
minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of sus-
pects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. Corruption
looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top
policymakers, laws on ﬁnancial disclosure and conﬂict of interest, and the
eﬃcacy of anticorruption initiatives” (Nations in Transit. Freedom House,
2014). In 2015 the subcategory of “governance” was separated into its na-
tional and local components.
Fig. 2. Freedom House “Nations in Transit” scores – Russia.
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Democracy in the World, international relations scholar
Pierre Hassner declared that “Putin is themost sinister ﬁgure
in contemporary Russian history… He has led Russia into
a harsh brand of authoritarianism with some fascist fea-
tures, and he remains under strong suspicion of having
inspired a number of criminal acts” (Hassner, 2008, 7).
Graeme Gill writes of the “hegemonic presidency” in Russia,
a phenomenon born of Yeltsin but greatly expanded by Putin
as the latter “continu[ed] to close off avenues of popular
control and to bring under his purview those aspects of the
power structure that had escaped the control of Yeltsin” (Gill,
2006, 70). He then describes the means by which Putin
sought greater control over aspects of Russian political life
and methodically extended his power over areas that had
remained outside the president’s control prior to his
presidency.
The impression given by these and similar analyses of
Russia’s authoritarianization under Putin is one of a delib-
erate and calculated expansion of authoritarian power at
Putin’s behest. Under this paradigm, Putin has been
proactively expansionary in his autocratic tendencies: where
the opportunity has arisen (or where the opportunity already
existed) for an assault on democracy, he has taken it. Though
rarely stated, the underlying assumption is that Putin has
sought since coming to oﬃce in 2000 tomaximize his power
over Russia. This assumption often lies at the core of early
(and later) analyses that looked to Putin’s KGB past as a sign-
post to his rule. The assumption of the power-maximizing
imperialist autocrat is pervasive throughout media treat-
ments of Putin’s reign as well, especially since his return
to the presidency in 2012. A 2012 analysis of Putin’s “path
to tyranny” states that “Vladimir Putin is rapidly transform-
ing Russia in to a repressive state reminiscent of the Soviet
Union.” It goes on, noting that “there had always been signs
that Putin was convinced that he could only perform his
duties with severity and ruthlessness” (Diez, Mayr, & Schepp,
2012). Longtime Russia watcher David Remnick writes of
“power for power’s sake” as a core tenet of “Putinism”
(Remnick, 2011).
Not surprisingly, the narrative of Putin as the power
maximizer appears in the political realm as well among
those in the West (and to a much lesser degree in Russia)
who have reason to oppose his rule. Former British Foreign
Secretary David Miliband calls him “ruthless” in the per-
formance of his “script for continued power” (Miliband,
2012). Former opposition Russian Duma Deputy – turned
political analyst Vladimir Ryzhkov wrote in 2012, “if left un-
controlled, Putin will turn into a Russian version of
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko,” a man who
is reported to relish his branding as the “last dictator of
Europe.”
More recently, in an op-ed titled, “Beware the rise of Putin
the Terrible,” the American Enterprise Institute’s Leon Aron
argues that Putin’s involvement in the Ukrainian crisis has
been intended to serve as “a political arrangement that could
secure his rule in Russia for life” by riding the wave of “na-
tionalist hysteria and paranoia” that the Kremlin’s
propagandists have engineered alongside the crisis. By
stoking the ﬁres of nationalism and raising the specter of
a hostile West, Aron asserts, Putin has struck upon a “con-
venient justiﬁcation for greater repression” in his
construction of a “personality-driven dictatorship.” (Aron,
2014). While Aron’s assertions and provocative language
might be best taken with a grain of salt, it is worth point-
ing out the underlying premise that Putin has manipulated
events in order to justify and support his preexisting con-
dition of lust for ever more power. Former chess champion
and well-known Russian opposition activist Garry Kasparov
goes even further, comparing Putin’s Ukrainian gambit to
Hitler’s 1938 invasion of Austria. On the domestic front,
Kasparov writes of Russia gripped by a long-running “cam-
paign to destroy democracy and civil liberties in Russia,”
orchestrated by a “bad guy whowas supporting rogue states
abroadwhile in Russia hewas persecuting dissidents, locking
down the media under state control and subordinating the
Rusian economy to the Kremlin and his small circle of
cronies” (Kasparov, 2014).
Further examples of the “power-hungry autocrat” nar-
rative abound in the scholarly, media, and political spheres
of the West. The purpose in highlighting the above ex-
amples is neither to lend them credence nor call them
into question (despite the occasional rhetorical over-
embellishments). Rather, the purpose is to illustrate the
dominant discourse surrounding Putin’s authoritarianization
of Russia since 2000: that of an individual who has sought
to maximize his political control and who has taken
nearly every available opportunity to do so, particularly
since returning to the presidency in 2012. If we accept the
constructivist premise that discourse has the power to
create its own reality and motivate policy, then it is worth
illuminating that discourse and putting its assumptions
on the table.
There is hardly a clear-eyed observer of Russian poli-
tics that would deny Russia’s descent into dictatorship
and who would question the singular role that Vladimir
Putin has played in leading Russia into the depths of
autocracy. While the evidence of Russia’s authoritarian
slide presented in Figures 1 and 2 is consistent with the
narrative elucidated above, I will argue that they are
consistent with another narrative. Rather than casting
Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian policies as part of a con-
stant effort to maximize his power, I argue that they have
rather been “defensive” in nature as reactions to per-
ceived threats. Drawing insights from a similar distinction
in the literature on international relations, I argue that
Putin’s authoritarianization of Russia – real though it is –
has been motivated by Putin’s drive to maximize his
security, not his power. Though the distinction might
seem a minor one at the moment, the implications of this
distinction are anything but insigniﬁcant, as they go to
the very core of Putin’s control of his vast country.
3. Maximizing power vs. security
The ﬁeld of international relations is deﬁned and orga-
nized by a handful of theoretical traditions, of which
(neo)realism, (neo)liberalism, and constructivism are the best
known and most inﬂuential. While each tradition encom-
passes a wide variety of theories explaining state behavior,
each tradition is uniﬁed by a more or less common set of
fundamental principles and assumptions about what states
seek and why they seek it. In other words, theories within
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a particular IR tradition tend to share a common worldview
regarding why states do what they do. By examining state
behavior through the lenses of these theoretical tradi-
tions, one can often bring those events into sharper focus
in order to advance toward a better understanding of the
“why?” question that sits at the heart of social scientiﬁc
inquiry.
While theory also occupies a central role in the sub-
ﬁeld of comparative politics, the latter subﬁeld is less deﬁned
(and some would say constrained) by comprehensive “tra-
ditions” like those that dominate IR. In many respects this
offers comparativists greater ﬂexibility and creativity when
it comes to theory generation, but there is an increasing ap-
preciation of the fact that insights developed in one subﬁeld
might shed useful light on the theoretical and empirical
questions that are the realm of another subﬁeld. The purpose
of this article is to do just that – to take some key insights
from IR theory, retool them to apply to the domestic context,
and then use them to explain the policies and actions of do-
mestic actors, in this case Vladimir Putin.
In many respects, this is the reverse of the process that
characterized the genesis of the modern ﬁeld of interna-
tional relations. Drawing their inspiration from the “original”
realists like Hobbes and Machiavelli, early post-WWII
theorists of international relations such as HansMorgenthau
began with a set of (somewhat unﬂattering) assumptions
about human nature. Of man’s real nature, Hobbes wrote,
“I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall
and restlesse desire for Power after power, that ceaseth
only in Death” (Hobbes, 1996, 70). Morgenthau and others
in what has become known as the “classical realist” school
of internationals relations then projected these human
traits (particularly the lust and will to power) onto states,
explaining states’ perpetual drive for greater power in
similar terms for similar motivations. Thus, his self-titled
“realist” theory of international politics asserted that “pol-
itics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws
that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau,
2006, 4). Indeed, it is the “aspiration for power” that was,
according to Morgenthau, “the distinguishing element of
international politics,” for “the tendency to dominate…is
an element of all human associations, from the family,
through fraternal and professional associations and local
political organizations, to the state (35, 37). Given the
inherent uncertainty regarding the true capabilities of
potential adversaries, Morgenthau argued that “all nations
must seek the maximum of power obtainable under the
circumstances,” resulting in a “limitless aspiration for
power” (219).
A similar conclusion – that states in the international
system aspire to accumulate themaximum amount of power
possible – is shared by a more modern school of IR theory,
that of offensive realism. In the deﬁning text on offensive
realism, John Mearsheimer notes that like Morgenthau’s
“human nature” realism, the theory portrays great powers
as “relentlessly seeking power” (Mearsheimer, 2014, 21).
However, as a member of the neorealist or structural realist
school of IR theory that arose a generation after Morgenthau,
Mearsheimer reaches this conclusion about a state’s drive
to maximize its power without reference to human nature
or any innate lust for power. Rather, the anarchic nature
of the international system requires great powers to seek
the maximum power possible. Echoing elements of
Morgenthau’s argument 50 years prior, Mearsheimer writes,
“given the diﬃculty of determining how much power is
enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that
the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegem-
ony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by
another great power.” Thus, powerful states will “act of-
fensively to amass as much power as it can, because states
are almost better off withmore rather than less power” (35).
However, a third branch of IR theory – that of defen-
sive realism – starts with different assumptions about power
and thus comes to divergent conclusions. Considered the
father of structural realism and its defensive realist variant,
KennethWaltz argued that security was the highest end that
states could pursue. Power, on the other hand, was of value
not as an end in itself (as assumed by classical realists) but
rather a means to achieve security and, ultimately, surviv-
al (Waltz, 2010, 126). Thus, “neorealism sees power as a
possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have
either too little or too much of it…Excessive strength may
prompt other states to increase their arms and pool their
efforts against the dominant state…[so] sensible states-
men try to have an appropriate amount” (Waltz, 1989, 40).
These crucial assumptions – that states seek to maximize
their security and that efforts to pursue maximum power
might ultimately reduce a state’s security – lead to the “de-
fensive” modiﬁer attached to this sub-school of realist
thought: security-seeking states will generally behave de-
fensively in order to maintain their position in the
international system rather than upset the balance of power
(Mearsheimer, 2014, 19–20).
Integral to the defensive realist school is the concept of
power balancing: states in an anarchic system, when met
with an adversary whose power is rising, will seek to balance
against that rising power in order to constrain the other’s
rise and ensure its own security. In the classic formula-
tion, “balancing” consists of forming defensive alliances with
other states whose security is also threatened by the rising
power. But Waltz distinguishes between this type of bal-
ancing, which he terms “external balancing” and what he
refers to as “internal balancing.” The latter consists of states
taking internal measures such as increasing domestic eco-
nomic capacity, increasingmilitary strength, and developing
superior strategies to counter the rising power (Waltz, 2010,
118). Because internal balancing means relying on a state’s
own capabilities rather than those of an external ally, Waltz
deems internal balancing to be “more reliable and precise
than external balancing” (168).
Yet history shows that it is not entirely accurate to say
that states will balance – whether internally or externally
– against superior or rising powers. If this were the case,
then Europe should have joined the Soviet Union in bal-
ancing against the United States during the Cold War (and
afterwards, for that matter), for America’s military and eco-
nomic capabilities far exceeded those of the Soviet Union.
Stephen Walt noted this discrepancy in his seminal work
on alliance formation. In it, Walt argues that states do not
simply balance against powerful states; rather, they balance
against threatening states (Walt, 1990, 5). The distinction is
a crucial one, as Walt makes the case that it is not raw ma-
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terial power alone that determines whether one state is
threatening to another. Rather, he identiﬁes four factors that
determine the threat posed by a potential adversary:
The ﬁrst is aggregate power: “All else being equal, the
greater a state’s total resources (e.g., population, industri-
al and military capability, and technological prowess), the
greater a potential threat it can pose to others” (22). This
is essentially what traditional balance of power theorists
argued. However, there is more than simply aggregate power
that must be considered. The second factor affecting threat
that Walt identiﬁes is geographic proximity: “Because the
ability to project power declines with distance, states that
are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away”
(23). The third threatening factor is offensive power: “All
else being equal, states with large offensive capabilities are
more likely to provoke an alliance than those that are in-
capable of attacking…Offensive power is also closely related
but not identical to aggregate power. Speciﬁcally, offen-
sive power is the ability to threaten the sovereignty or
territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost”
(24). Finally, Walt recognizes the crucial importance of ag-
gressive intentions: “states that are viewed as aggressive are
likely to provoke others to balance against them” (25). On
this ﬁnal element of threat Walt recognizes the fact that
“perceptions of intent” – and conversely, misperceptions –
“are likely to play an especially crucial role” in balancing
decisions (Walt, 1990, 25). This fourth factor of (per-
ceived) aggressive intentions solves the riddle posed above:
Europe balanced against the Soviet Union rather than the
United States because the former was perceived to have ag-
gressive intentions along with the offensive power and
geographical proximity to achieve them.
4. Domesticating the argument
Let us now turn to the matter of “domesticating” these
insights from the defensive realist school of IR theory and
constructing a similar lens through which to view the
authoritarianizing policies of Vladimir Putin. To be sure, there
are some important areas in which the analogy will need
to be relaxed just a bit. First and foremost, there is thematter
of what Waltz referred to as the ordering principle of the
system: most of the key insights drawn by structural real-
ists derived from the anarchic nature of the international
system, wherein there is no overarching political–military
authority above sovereign states.2 Domestic political systems,
of course, are hierarchical: there is such an authority known
as the state which claims (according to Weber’s classic for-
mulation) “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory” (Weber, 1946, 78). But just
because the system is hierarchical and the state lays claim
to the legitimate use of violence does not mean that power
is not contested – sometimes even violently – within that
polity. Indeed, Weber recognized this fact, noting it in the
very same lecture as his more famous declaration quoted
above: “ ‘politics’ for us means striving to share power or
striving to inﬂuence the distribution of power, either among
states or among groups within a state” (78). Morgenthau,
writing in the ﬁrst edition of his Politics Among Nations
echoedWeber’s sentiment: “Domestic and international pol-
itics are but two different manifestations of the same
phenomenon: the struggle for power” (Morgenthau, 1948,
21).
That domestic politics is in its most essential form a
struggle over power and its distribution is hardly contro-
versial. Nonetheless, we still might expect domestic political
actors engaged in the struggle for power to mirror the be-
haviors and motives of states as the latter seek power in the
international system. Though domestic actors in a hierar-
chical domestic political system face greater institutional
constraints in their pursuit of power than do states in
anarchy, the basic principles of competition, power, secu-
rity, and threat still come into play to differing degrees. To
be sure, it is important to acknowledge that domestic in-
stitutional constraints may matter a great deal. Unlike the
anarchic international system, which forces all states to
behave in a similar fashion as security seekers, robust do-
mestic institutions that effectively constrain and divide
political power may mitigate the more intense and poten-
tially violent power competition that a domestic realist
theory of politics would predict. When considering domes-
tic political systems, therefore, it is useful to view them along
a spectrum that runs from anarchy (lack of any regulative
institutions) to a highly ordered and institutionalized system
that regulates and divides political power. The closer a state
falls toward the anarchic end of the spectrum, the more we
should expect its politics to mirror the contentious zero-
sum competition that characterizes international politics.
I argue that Russia under Putin falls on this conten-
tious end of the spectrumwhen it comes to the institutions
that constrain and regulate the acquisition, division, con-
straints, and succession of power. Though formal institutions
exist to delineate such things, the experience of the last 16
years in Russia has shown that such institutions are often
malleable, weak, and subject to revision. This, combinedwith
the fact that the stakes of gaining or losing power in Russia
are quite high, leads me to argue that domestic politics in
Russia more closely resembleWaltz’s security dilemma than
to the politics of well-institutionalized democracies. For
Waltz’s international system and Putin’s Russia share two
crucial characteristics: competition is a zero-sum game in
Putin’s eyes, putting survival at stake for all actors in the
political arena.
Recalling the key distinction between the classical and
offensive realists on the one hand and defensive realists on
the other, I argue that Putin’s ultimate objective is to maxi-
mize his security, not his power. While the slow creep of
authoritarianism in Russia over the last 15 years has, of
course, been characterized in a steady increase in the Krem-
lin’s power, I argue that the underlying motivation has not
been the insatiable drive for maximum power that appears
in the “power-hungry autocrat” narrative that dominates
much discourse on Putin. Rather, the underlying motiva-
tion is that which has been found in autocrats for most of
history: the desire to survive in power. According to the do-
mestic defensive realist argument, Putin’s authoritarian
2 For more on the central role that anarchy plays in conditioning state
behavior in the international system, see chapter 6 of Waltz (2010) and
chapter 2 of Mearsheimer (2014).
49R. Person / Journal of Eurasian Studies 8 (2017) 44–59
march has not been the result of a proactive drive to expand
power but has instead been a defensive reaction to per-
ceived threats to his political security and survival. It is also
worth noting that Putin very likely sees his political secu-
rity as synonymous with Russia’s security and survival: in
2014, Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vyacheslav Volodin fa-
mously declared to an audience of western analysts that “any
attack on Putin is an attack on Russia…There is no Russia
today if there is no Putin,” a sentiment that Volodin’s boss
no doubt shares (The Moscow Times, 2014).
To say that these policies have been defensive reac-
tions is not to seek to justify them or excuse them in any
way, as the result is still the same: they have resulted in the
drastic erosion of democracy and political liberties in Russia.
But the defensive realist argument produces an important
set of implications distinct from those based on the as-
sumption of offensive power maximization. I will return to
this topic in the concluding section of the article.
At this point it is useful to integrate Walt’s balance of
threat theory and its four elements of threat into the the-
oretical framework. Doing so leads me to the assertion that
Putin has not reacted simply to the power held by other
actors in the Russian domestic sphere; rather, he has reacted
against those actors that pose a perceived threat to his
control. The two are not synonymous, and there are in-
stances described below where Putin has tolerated the
former while acting against the latter. To sum up this part
of the argument, it is not political or economic power alone
that makes a potential rival threatening to Putin. What is
determined to be a threat depends on the amount of power
an actor possesses, what kind of power he possesses, where
that power resides, and – crucially – what the actor’s
intentions are.
Aggregate Power. When considering aggregate power
in the domestic context, I return to Dahl’s elegantly simple
deﬁnition of political power as a relation among people
wherein “A has power over B to the extent that he can get
B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl,
1957, 202–203). Political, economic, and social forms of
capital can all be utilized to coerce, convince, or cajole an
actor to take an action that he would otherwise prefer not
to take. Those who possess such capital (A) can thus be un-
derstood to possess “aggregate power,” and thus pose at least
some threat to Putin’s (B) security if they are able to lever-
age that power to cause Putin to act in ways that he would
not otherwise do.
Offensive Power. It is more challenging to distin-
guish offensive power from aggregate power in the domestic
context than it is in the international context. However, if
we understand the term to mean the ability to launch some
sort of offensive attack on an actor’s interests, we can begin
to draw the necessary distinctions. An offensive attack in
the domestic sphere would be any deliberate action by actor
A that is meant to increase A’s power at the expense of B’s
power. First and foremost, offensive domestic power (A)must
be independent of the object of that power (B). Cast in
Russian terms, a political–economic elite’s sources of power
must be independent of the Kremlin in order for it to be
used offensively against the latter’s interests. Thus, politi-
cal elites with independent bases of support among the
public and elite subgroups pose a greater risk of acting
against the center’s interests than do political elites who owe
their position to Putin’s apparatus. Similarly, private owners
of capital in sectors of the economy that remain outside state
control pose greater risk than those whose wealth is di-
rectly dependent on the good will of the Kremlin. In this
regard, asset speciﬁcity is also a relevant consideration:
owners of speciﬁc assets pose less offensive threat than do
owners of non-speciﬁc assets because speciﬁc assets can
more easily be seized by the state if necessary. The mass
media with its ability to shape public opinion and inﬂu-
ence mass mobilization can also be understood as an
exemplar of potential offensive power and thus a signiﬁ-
cant potential threat to Putin’s security in oﬃce.
Geographic Proximity. There is an obvious way to
translate’s Walt’s statement on geographic proximity to the
domestic context: the closer that A is to B, the greater the
threat that A poses to B. In the Russian context, challenges
to Putin’s authority (B) will be the most threatening if taken
by actors (A) in Moscow, the seat of Russia’s highly-
centralized political and economic system. Lesser threats
will be those in St. Petersburg and othermajor Russian cities,
while more distant threats spread across Russia’s vast ter-
ritory will pose a greatly reduced threat. However, we can
also interpret “proximity” in terms of a threat’s centrality
to the state’s core strategic interests. Certain domestic in-
dustries like oil and gas, mineral, metals, and weapons
manufacturing have been deemed strategically signiﬁ-
cant. Risks to those industries, many of which are controlled
by the state itself, will be considered more threatening than
risks to peripheral or non-strategic sectors of the economy.
Aggressive Intentions. Finally, when considering the
threat posed by A’s power to make B do something that B
does not wish to do, we must consider A’s intentions. In the
abstract and in reality, there are powerful and proximate
players in the political, economic, and social spheres who
are perceived as posing a limited threat because they have
signaled benign intentions to the Kremlin and do not seek
to challenge Putin’s authority. This does not mean that such
actors pose no threat, as their intentions could always
change. But the most serious threats posed to the Kremlin
emanate from powerful actors who have expressed aggres-
sive intentions against Putin’s system of rule. Again, it is
worth remembering that one cannot speak of intentions
without noting the role of perception and misperception.
Since perception often generates its own reality, it is perhaps
more accurate to think in terms of “perceived aggressive in-
tentions” as a key driver of threats.
It is also worth noting that there is a special place in
Putin’s pantheon of threats for those who have or are per-
ceived to have the ﬁnancial support of foreign actors.
Domestic political actors, parties, or NGOs that receive ﬁ-
nancial support fromwestern NGOs or western governments
(especially the United States) are seen as especially threat-
ening because they potentially combine offensive capabilities
with perceived aggressive intentions. That some of these
foreign actors and governments are thought to support
regime change in Russia makes them an intolerable – and
highly dangerous – threat in Putin’s eyes.
Summarizing the Argument. To sum up, the domes-
tic defensive realist explanation of Putin’s authoritarianizing
policies rests on the following principles.
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1. Political competition in Russia today is perceived by Putin
as a zero-sum struggle for security.
2. In this environment, Putin’s policies are motivated by
an imperative to maximize security of his rule and sur-
vival in oﬃce.
3. Putin’s authoritarianizing policies have been defensive
responses to perceived threats to his security, not an of-
fensive will to maximum power.
4. Aggregate power: All else equal, powerful actors in the
Russian political, economic, and social spheres are more
threatening than those without signiﬁcant power.
5. Offensive power: All else equal, actors with the
ability to deploy domestic “offensive” power are more
threatening.
6. Geographic proximity: All else equal, powerful actors
located in the centers of power (both literally and ﬁgu-
ratively) are more threatening.
7. Aggressive intentions: The greatest source of threat arises
from oppositional actors with the desire to see Putin’s
exit from power or a signiﬁcant weakening of his control.
5. Authoritarianization as balance of threat
I argue that the key events and policies that have char-
acterized Vladimir Putin’s re-authoritarianization of Russia
since 2000 follow the patterns and principles laid out in the
domestic defensive realist framework. That is to say, they
have largely been defensive reactions to perceived threats
to his authority and security rather than elements of a pre-
meditated strategy to maximize his political power. Each
of these episodes and policies can be understood in terms
of at least one of the four threat factors discussed above, a
task to which I turn in the present section. Before doing so,
it is worth noting that the available data and case study
method can, at best, provide a strong plausibility test of the
argument by showing that events are consistent with a de-
fensive realist interpretation. Without access to Putin’s
innermost thoughts, it is hard to deﬁnitively rule out the
“power maximizer” thesis, though careful examination of
the sequencing and nature of the key events will help bolster
the credibility of the defensive realist argument.
This section will do so by examining Russia’s authori-
tarian descent thematically within the realms of institutional
reforms; electoral manipulation; media and business; and
civil society.3
5.1. Institutional reforms
When Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency of Russia
in 2000, the oﬃce had been weakened by nearly a decade
of Yeltsin’s tumultuous leadership and its attendant crises
in the political, economic, and social spheres. Shortly after
taking oﬃce, Putin began implementing institutional
changes to Russia’s political structure in order to consoli-
date presidential authority and weaken alternative centers
of power that might threaten central political control. One
of the earliest reactions to potential threats took place in
opposition to Russia’s governors who, during Yeltsin’s tenure,
took to heart the latter’s 1990 exhortation to “take all the
autonomy you can swallow” (Breslauer, 2002, 125). In doing
so, Russia’s regional leaders cultivated independent bases
of support and managed to accumulate signiﬁcant power
that was autonomous of the Kremlin. Perhaps most famous
was the case of Mintimer Shaimiev, head of Russia’s Re-
public of Tatarstan whose efforts to carve out the region’s
(and his own) political autonomy were once thought to be
second only to Chechnya as a threat to Russia’s territorial
sovereignty (The Economist, 2007). Other regional leaders
pursued such efforts to a lesser degree and could rightly be
considered during Yeltsin’s presidency as formidable centers
of power residing outside the total embrace of the Kremlin.
This regionally-based power, to include in some cases
control or inﬂuence over highly valuable natural resources
located within regions, plausibly ﬁts with the domestic ver-
sions of aggregate power and offensive power outlined
above. Their control over signiﬁcant political and econom-
ic resources (including inmany cases strong public support),
along with the autonomy to use that power to their own
ends, made powerful regional leaders a potential threat to
the Kremlin’s central control of the country. The threat was
especially salient in the early years of Putin’s presidency as
Moscow fought the bloody war against Chechen separatists.
Starting in 2000, Putin sought to “balance” against that
threat by taking aim at the sources of their power and au-
tonomy. In that year, regional governors were removed from
their seats on the Federation Council, the upper house of
the Russian parliament.4 This reform had the effect of sepa-
rating the governors from the power of the legislative branch
while also physically removing them from Moscow where
manymaintained residences and spent a signiﬁcant portion
of their time. This calls to mind the principle of proximate
power, discussed above, and its contribution to the threat
matrix faced by the domestic defensive realist.
It was also in 2000 that Putin established seven federal
“super districts” to further solidify central control over
the regions and rein in renegade governors. Each federal
district was overseen by a presidential appointee tasked
with ensuring the enforcement of federal laws and poli-
cies. Furthermore, the reform was designed to reassert
central control over the federal agencies based in the
regions, the heads of which had in many cases developed
stronger loyalties to governors than to the central govern-
ment (McFaul, 2007a).
But the greatest assault on the power and autonomy of
potentially threatening regional leaders came in 2004 with
the elimination of gubernatorial elections.5 Themeasure was
passed swiftly in the wake of the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis
3 For “a chronological sampling of the suppression of political opposi-
tion, independent media, and civil society,” see Puddington et al.
(2012, 14–20). For more detailed discussions of these elements of
authoritarianization in Russia, see the series of “Nations in Transit”
and “Freedom in the World” reports by Freedom House, listed in the
bibliography.
4 Prior to 2000, each region held two seats on the Federation Council:
one was ﬁlled by the regional governor and one was ﬁlled by the head of
the regional parliament. Following the 2000 reforms, one seat was ﬁlled
by nomination from the governor; the second seat was ﬁlled by election
of the regional parliament.
5 See Person (2015) for extended discussion and analysis of the elim-
ination of gubernatorial elections in Russia.
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in North Ossetia, cited as a necessary means to prevent such
threats in the future. To be sure, it is hard to see how such
ameasure could have prevented the crisis, but when viewed
in the larger effort to circumscribe the power of regional
elites it stands out as the ultimate means of reducing any
possible regional threat to Putin’s power. Under these
reforms, the president obtained the power to appoint and
dismiss regional governors with the rubber-stamped ap-
proval of pliant regional parliaments. Thus, within a few
years of the reforms all of Russia’s governors had gone from
being potential threats to Putin’s power to Kremlin loyal-
ists dependent on the good will of the president for their
political survival. This fact, combined with the reforms to
the Federation Council described above, ensured that both
institutions would no longer pose a threat to the Krem-
lin’s security. In the wake of mass protests following the
manipulated 2011 Duma elections, it was announced that
direct election of governors would be restored in Russia. This
move was seen as a concession to the public’s vocal reac-
tion against Russia’s overly-managed political theater that
suggests a careful balancing act for the sake of maintain-
ing the security of the Putin–Medvedev tandem system.
While powermaximizers would be expected to cling to such
authority, I would suggest that Putin the security maxi-
mizer recognized the risk of doing so.
The lower house of Russia’s parliament, the Duma, and
the political parties populating it were not spared Putin’s
attentions either. Recall that for the entirety of the 1990s
the Duma was populated by an often-changing collection
of diverse parties, none of which ever gained a majority in
the mixed PR-SMD system. While some of these parties
were explicitly or implicitly recognized as pro-Kremlin
parties, no pro-government coalition was able to form a
majority in the Duma during the 1990s. In fact, it was the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation that won the
largest share of seats in the 1995 and 1999 elections, a
reality that would stymie Yeltsin’s efforts to pass legisla-
tion and continue economic and political reforms in the
later half of the decade. There was little question that the
Duma marched to its own drum during this period and
existed as a signiﬁcant center of power outside the control
of the Kremlin.
The tide began to shift in the 1999 Duma elections when
the recently-formed Unity party came in close second to the
Communist Party with 23.3 percent of the vote. Though
created only three months prior to the elections, this pro-
government predecessor to the United Russia party was able
to capitalize on the popular Prime Minister Putin’s support
in achieving a surprisingly strong electoral showing. None-
theless, once in the president’s oﬃce, Putin begin to actively
modify the playing ﬁeld to ensure that the Duma would be
dominated by a loyal – and non-threatening – pro-Kremlin
majority. The 2003 Duma election was marked by reports
of widespread electoral fraud and manipulation, which was
successful in delivering 223 out of 450 seats to the recog-
nized party of power, United Russia.6 Though this result,
combined with additional seats from smaller pro-Putin
parties, ensured that the Kremlin’s legislation could be
passed, the representation of vocal opposition parties in the
Duma continued to make the institution a potential locus
for independent political power.
I argue that the residual power and independence of Rus-
sia’s opposition parties residing in the Dumawere suﬃcient
threats to Putin’s political control to prompt additional in-
stitutional reforms to neutralize the threat. In 2006, a law
was passed that stripped Duma deputies of their seats if they
changed political parties while also prohibiting the forma-
tion of electoral alliances wherein multiple parties could
throw their support behind a single candidate. The move
was intended to cement the dominant position of United
Russia and make it nearly impossible for opposition parties
and candidates to win signiﬁcant power.
The reaction to the threat of parliamentary opposition
continued in the lead up to the 2007 Duma elections as the
Kremlin (through its now-pliant Duma) took measures to
ensure United Russia’s security as the unchallenged dom-
inant party. Under the 2007 reforms, single member districts
were eliminated, with the entire Duma to be elected ac-
cording to a PR system based on party lists. This made it
impossible for independent candidates to win seats as they
had once done in districts, since nobody could take a Duma
seat without being on a party list. Furthermore, the reforms
made it much harder for opposition to gain representa-
tion in the upcoming Duma, as the threshold for electoral
support was raised from 5% to 7%. Furthermore, in order to
be registered as political parties and eligible to contest the
election, parties were required to have at least 50,000 total
members, with a minimum of 500 members in at least half
of Russia’s 83 regions. This ensured that only well-funded
and well-organized national parties would be effectively
allowed to compete, further tilting the playing ﬁeld toward
those parties loyal to the Kremlin. The electoral reforms had
their intended effect, with any possibility of threat ema-
nating from the Duma virtually eliminated after the 2007
elections. Four parties passed the 7% threshold: United Russia
(64.3%), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
(11.6%), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (8.1%), and
A Just Russia (7.7%). Of these four, only the communists
served as a real opposition party to United Russia and the
Kremlin.
This supermajority raises the important case of the in-
stitutional “dog that didn’t bark,” to borrow the episode from
the famous Sherlock Holmes story. Even prior to the achieve-
ment of the constitutional super majority in 2007, there was
speculation across the Russian political class that Putin
would easily have the political and popular support to
amend the constitution and eliminate the presidential term
limits that would prevent him from running for a third con-
secutive term in oﬃce. Indeed, this period coincides with
one of the highest points of Putin’s popularity: in 2007
Putin’s approval rating never dropped below 79 percent and
reached a high of 87 percent in December of that year (CSPP,
2014). Instead of doing so and ensuring uninterrupted
control of Russia’s political system, Putin opted to arrange
the now-famous swap with then-Prime Minister Dmitri
Medvedev, who would run for president with Putin to serve
as the former’s prime minister. Many suspected that the in-
tention had always been for Putin to return to the presidency
6 For an exhaustive study of electoral fraud in Russia, see Myagkov et al.
(2009).
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in 2012, making the 2008 decision a bit puzzling.7 The strat-
egy came with risks – that Medvedev would renege on the
arrangement, that unforeseen events and public opinion
might complicate a return to the presidency, and others.Why
take such risks when it would have been possible to settle
the issue with greater certainty with an elimination of term
limits before the 2008 election?
This article cannot offer a deﬁnitive answer except to note
that the episode is consistent with the domestic defensive
realist perspective. One would have expected a power-
hungry maximizer to jump on the opportunity to cement
his political control in a highly permissive environment. And
yet Putin did not do so. I suggest that he felt secure enough
in his position at the time that he did not see it as neces-
sary to amend the constitution. By understanding Putin as
a security seeker responding to threats rather than a power
maximizer seizing opportunities, this puzzling episode
comes into sharper focus as a key moment when Putin
clearly did not act in the interest of maximum power. While
the presidential termwas extended from 4 years to 6 by con-
stitutional amendment in 2008, it is notable that the term
limits were maintained at that time as well, again suggest-
ing an opportunity for power maximization that was
deliberately declined.
5.2. Electoral manipulation
Another well-known element of Russia’s
authoritarianization under Putin has been the manipula-
tion of electoral processes with a regime best characterized
as “competitive authoritarian,” deﬁned by Levitsky andWay
(2010) as “civilian regimes in which formal democratic in-
stitutions exist and arewidely viewed as the primarymeans
of gainingpower, but inwhich incumbents’ abuse of the state
places them at a signiﬁcant advantage vis-a-vis their oppo-
nents. Such regimes are competitive in that oppositionparties
use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power,
but theyarenotdemocraticbecause theplayingﬁeld isheavily
skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but
unfair” (5). This uneven playing ﬁeld, marked by the use of
state resources and other advantages of incumbency was
present in the 2003–2004 electoral cycle but was taken to
newextremesduring the2007–2008electoral cycle (Myagkov,
Ordeshook, & Shakin, 2009, 116–118).
A domestic offensive realist explanation would see this
intensiﬁcation of electoral fraud as part of the inexorable
drive to expand Putin’s power over the Russia political
system. A set of key intervening events between the 2003–
2004 cycle and the 2007–2008 challenges this interpretation.
These events are the “colored revolutions” that swept aside
semi-authoritarian incumbents in several post-communist
states, including Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyr-
gyzstan (2005). Importantly, these regime changeswere each
centered around fraudulent elections, leading scholars to
identify the “electoral model” of regime transitions across
the region (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006). There is little ques-
tion that Putin and his retinue similarly identiﬁed the pattern
of like-minded incumbents falling to mass protest move-
ments centered around electoral events. In an effort to
counter the potential threat to his political survival, Putin
kept the tightest of reins on the electoral contest. While the
fraud itself is instructive, more telling is the unabashed use
of state resources, harassment of opposition parties and
ﬁgures, and heavy use of state media to control the playing
ﬁeld and send a clear message that no colored revolution
would be allowed in Russia. With the electoral competi-
tion perceived as a potential threat to his survival, especially
following the lessons learned in the colored revolutions in
the “near abroad,” Putin reacted preventively and deci-
sively to head off this threat before it materialized.
If the tight control over the 2007–2008 cycle was seen
by the Kremlin as a successful preventive measure against
a potential threat, the same cannot be said for the 2011–
2012 cycle that brought Putin back into the presidency.
Marked by widespread protests in Moscow and other large
cities, the latest electoral cycle revealed to Putin new ex-
istential threats to the security of his rule, prompting new
unprecedented reactions to those threats. That reaction will
be treated in a subsequent section of the article.
5.3. Media and business
Thus far we have seen evidence of theway inwhich Putin
has reacted in the institutional and electoral realms to
counter domestic variants of aggregate, offensive, and prox-
imate power that potentially threaten his security as Russia’s
vozhd, or supreme leader. In this section, we will see how
the combination of domestic offensive power and aggres-
sive intentions among certain members of the business and
media classes provoked strong reactive responses.
Recall from above that offensive power in the domestic
understanding is political power that can be utilized and
projected against the power, control, and security of the
central government. Its ability to be used offensively to
threaten the regime’s security derives from the degree to
which it is independent of Kremlin control, the degree to
which it is tied to speciﬁc assets, and its ability to mobi-
lize elite and mass option and action. With this
understanding, we see that some of Russia’s wealthy oli-
garchs, particularly those with powerful media empires,
potentially posed signiﬁcant threats to Putin under certain
circumstances.
Putin made clear early on what was expected of those
oligarchs whose wealth, power, and inﬂuence – actively
wielded for their own beneﬁt throughout the Yeltsin era –
made a potential threat to the Kremlin’s new master. In a
July 2000 meeting with oligarchs, Putin was reported as
having set down the rules in no uncertain terms: the Kremlin
would not interfere in their business activities or revisit the
questionable privatizations of the 1990s as long as the oli-
garchs stayed out of politics and refrained from criticizing
Putin (Goldman, 2004, 34).
Particularly noteworthy are the two individuals who vio-
lated Putin’s conditions early on and drew the swift wrath
of the Kremlin. The ﬁrst was media magnate Vladimir
7 At the September 2011 United Russia party convention where Putin
and Medvedev announced that the latter would not stand for reelection,
Putin told listeners “I want to say directly: An agreement over what to do
in the future was reached between us several years ago.” Medvedev con-
curred: “we really discussed this possible turn of events at the time when
we formed our comradely union.” (Barry, 2011).
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Gusinsky, whose empire of television, radio, and newspa-
pers was openly critical of Putin and his policies, particularly
those related to the war in Chechnya. Particularly threat-
ening to Putin’s position was Gusinsky’s NTV television
network, one of few Russian television networks with na-
tionwide reach. Following months of harassment by tax
police and other legal authorities, Gusinsky eventually ﬂed
abroad and a controlling stake in NTV was acquired by
Gazprom, effectively putting control of the network in the
Kremlin’s hands.
The ability to pose an offensive threat through critical
use of media assets also brought the Kremlin into conﬂict
with Boris Berezovsky, ironically one of Yeltsin’s inner circle
who had advocated Putin’s selection as Yeltsin’s heir. Though
Berezovsky and his ORT nationwide television network were
vocal supporters of Putin’s 2000 presidential campaign, by
the end of the year the magnate had fallen out with the
Kremlin and had launched a series of highly critical attacks
on Putin, including the latter’s handling of the Kursk sub-
marine disaster (36–37). Putin’s reaction to this threat was
swift and unambiguous: responding to an interviewer’s
question about Berezovsky’s criticisms, Putin replied, “The
state has a cudgel in its hands that you use to hit just once,
but on the head…We haven’t used this cudgel yet. We’ve
just brandished it, which is enough to keep someone’s at-
tention. The day we get really angry, we won’t hesitate to
use it… It is inadmissible to blackmail the state. If neces-
sary, we will destroy those instruments that allow this
blackmail” (The Moscow Times, 2000). The unsubtle hint was
not lost on Berezovsky, who declined to return to Russia from
international traveling, beginning his self-imposed exile in
London. Divested of his share of ORT under pressure from
the Kremlin in 2001, Berezovsky would also lose control of
his TV-6 network, another national network that was liq-
uidated in legal proceedings in early 2002. The simultaneous
termination of the independent TVS network, also critical
of the Kremlin, ensured that all major television outlets, from
which a majority of Russians get their news, were under the
direct or indirect control of the Kremlin.
Here it is important to note the importance of aggres-
sive intentions, one of the four threat factors in our domestic
defensive realist theory. While powerful oligarchs with ex-
tensive media holdings are potentially threatening to the
Kremlin, it is only those that used those “weapons” in an
offensive manner – by criticizing Putin and his policies –
who were acted against. Other oligarchs, such as Roman
Abramovich who owns a majority stake in Russia’s Channel
One (successor to Berezovsky’s ORT), have been left in peace.
What distinguishes Abramovich (and others) frommen like
Berezovsky and Gusinsky is the willingness to toe the party
line and refrain from threatening Putin’s control. They have
lived up to their end of the July 2000 agreement, and Putin
has thus had little inclination to take action against them,
consistent with the balance-of-threat theory.
When considering the matter of the media as a domes-
tic offensive weapon in the political sphere, it is also
worthwhile to note that capabilities matter greatly in de-
termining how and whether the Kremlin will react to
counter a threat. Small pockets of criticism have been tol-
erated in some print and radio outlets such as EkhoMoskvy,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Novaya Gazeta, The Moscow Times
(English) and other smaller outlets critical of the Kremlin,
largely because of their limited circulation outside the capitol
and limited readership beyond the intelligentsia. Consis-
tent with the predictions of the domestic defensive realist
theory, these outlets have, for much of Putin’s rule, posed
little practical threat to Putin’s power as their limited cir-
culation minimizes their mobilizational power. This fact
highlights the Kremlin’s sensitivity to both capabilities and
intentions when assessing political threats. However, in re-
action to the political upheaval in Ukraine in 2014 and the
fears that it could spread to Moscow, the Kremlin has re-
cently evenmoved against some of this more minor outlets,
including Ekho Moskvy (radio) and the small independent
television TV Dozhd, which had covered the 2011–2012 pro-
tests extensively. In the case of the former, Kremlin pressure
forced a change in station management, installing a Putin
ally in the position of CEO in 2014. In the case of Dozhd,
pressure from the Kremlin compelled major Russian tele-
vision service providers to drop the network in the same
year.
Though not a media magnate, one cannot discuss Putin’s
reaction against threats posed by powerful oligarchs without
considering the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, once Rus-
sia’s richest man and head of Yukos, once one of Russia’s
largest and most successful oil and gas companies. Though
Khodorkovsky had long funded a variety of political parties,
in 2003 his direct involvement in politics accelerated, with
the oligarch reportedly offering $100 million to the liberal
opposition parties Yabloko and SPS to join forces in oppo-
sition to Putin and the United Russia Party (Goldman, 2004).
This, along with Khodorkovsky’s increasingly vocal public
criticism of Putin and his policies, along with insinuations
of a 2008 presidential run, were a clear violation of the
“bargain” made with the oligarchs in 2000. Indeed,
Khodorkovsky posed a direct threat to Putin’s security that
the latter could not ignore. Goldman writes,
More and more, it appeared that, with his immense
wealth, control over what was about to become the
world’s fourth-largest oil company, and considerable in-
ﬂuence in the Duma, Khodorkovsky saw himself as
beyond the control of the Kremlin. No businessman had
ever reached that point before, neither under the tsar
nor under Yeltsin, and Putin was determined not to let
it happen on his watch either.
In Khodorkovsky Putin faced an opponent with immense
aggregate power, offensive power underwritten by inde-
pendence from Kremlin control, control over natural
resources directly proximate to the Russian state’s core in-
terests, and aggressive intentions against Putin. In many
respects, Mikhail Khodorkovsky was the most fully-formed
threat to emerge during Putin’s rule, a fact that accounts
for the particular ferocity with which he was arrested, tried,
and jailed for tax-related charges in 2003. Putin faced this
existential threat exactly as wewould expect a domestic de-
fensive realist to do.
This balance-of-threat perspective also helps clarify
trends in Russia’s internet policies over the duration of
Putin’s rule as well. In 2013, the Levada Center, an inde-
pendent polling ﬁrm, reported that 59% of Russians were
internet users. That number was up from only 5% in 2001
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(Two Thirds of Russians are Internet Users – Survey, 2013).
As internet usage has expanded during the Putin era and
as it is become a key means for publishing opposition view-
points and organizing anti-regime activities, so too has the
Kremlin’s restriction of internet freedom increased in re-
sponse. Freedom House’s inaugural Freedom on the Net
report, ﬁrst issued in 2009, noted the following in the Russia
country report:
After the elimination of independent television chan-
nels in 2000–01 and the tightening of press regulations,
the internet became the last relatively uncensored plat-
form for public debate and the expression of political
opinions. There have not been any signiﬁcant cases of
technical blocking or ﬁltering, but the authorities have
increasingly engaged in intentional content removal. In-
ternet freedom has corroded signiﬁcantly in recent years,
and this trend is borne out by the statistics: one inter-
net activist killed, seven criminal cases launched against
bloggers, one blogger badly beaten, and ten opposi-
tional blogs attacked by hackers (Karlekar & Cook, 2009,
85).
Perhaps not surprisingly, this trend accelerated in the lead
up to and aftermath of the 2011–2012 elections, in which
opposition ﬁgures and movements were able to success-
fully mobilize major protests in Moscow through the use
of the internet. Putin’s government has targeted such ﬁgures
and their internet outlets through a variety of measures, in-
cluding utilization of themany vague “anti-extremism” laws
passed throughout Putin’s tenure (ﬁrst passed in 2002 and
expanded in 2006, 2007, and 2008). While these mea-
sures were widely used to target critical traditional news
outlets during much of this period, the growing threat from
internet sources prompted a revision of the law in 2014 that
explicitly targeted online communications, seen by many
as a reaction to the political upheaval in Ukraine. Accord-
ing to the Kremlin’s English-language mouthpiece, RT
(formerly Russia Today), “The [2014] laws are in line with
the Russia’s anti-extremism strategy, prepared by the In-
terior Ministry and presented to public in mid-June.
According to the document, the authorities see the inter-
net as the main channel for spreading dangerous
information, and want to counter the threat through in-
tensive monitoring of the web and imposing traditional
values on the young” (RT (Russia Today), 2014).
Targeting vocal opposition ﬁgures and online news
outlets that give voice to the Kremlin’s critics by labeling
them extremists has been paired with direct targeting of
access to certain sites as well because of their content. In
2012 the Duma passed a law authorizing the creation of a
federal blacklist of websites that can be blocked without
court oversight. According to the 2013 report of internet
freedom in Russia, between January 2012 and February
2013, the number of websites blocked by the Ministry of
Justice due to “extremist content” increased 60% (Kelly
et al., 2013). In 2014 this power was used to block Russian
access to the websites of opposition ﬁgures Garry Kasparov
and Alexei Navalny, the anti-Kremlin blogger who gained
notoriety (as well as arrest) during the 2011–2012 elec-
tion protests.
And so, as internet usage has spread across Russia and
become a key source for subversive content, the Kremlin
has come to recognize the impressive mobilizational of-
fensive power that the medium offers. This power was
utilized to great effect in 2011–2012 in bringing out thou-
sands into Moscow’s streets to protest the ﬂawed elections.
Fearful of the threat that this poses to his security and sur-
vival, Putin in reacting against this threat has behaved exactly
as would be predicted by the domestic defensive realist
theory.
5.4. Civil society
In what is emerging as a familiar pattern, the gradual
tightening of control over civil society and individual po-
litical liberties has followed a similar pattern of reaction in
response to evolving and growing threats to the regime’s
security and survival. Freedom House’s assessment of the
climate faced by NGOs in Russia in 2002 is instructive: “Pres-
ident Putin’s approach to NGOs has largely been one of
establishing dialogue with groups and then attempting to
coopt them. Groups critical of Putin’s policies are simply
marginalized” (Orttung, 2003). This relatively benign atti-
tude toward NGOs would not last long, however. Inklings
of what lay ahead could be seen in the 2002 law passed
giving the government authority to suspend the activities
of organizations whose members are accused of “extrem-
ism” (Puddington, Roylance, Machalek, & Huston, 2012, 15).
Though initially justiﬁed as a response to separatist ex-
tremism in the North Caucasus as well as domestic hate
crimes, the law was considered by many to be suﬃciently
vague as to potentially serve as a weapon against any group
engaged in political activity.
Indifference and suspicion of NGOs developed into out-
right hostility as a result of the prominent role that western-
funded NGOs played in supporting Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution of 2004–2005. Indeed, many Russians (and re-
portedly Putin himself) consider the Orange Revolution to
have been orchestrated by the United States through NGO
proxies as a deliberate move against Russian interests in its
sphere of inﬂuence (Poolos, 2007).8 Witnessing the poten-
tial “offensive threat” that well-organized and well-funded
NGOs could pose to his authority through mass mobiliza-
tion, Putin took action to neutralize this threat before it fully
formed in Russia. NGOs dependent on domestic sources of
funding could be pressured easily enough, but foreign-
funded organizations were another matter. In July 2005,
Putin called for restrictions on foreign ﬁnancing of NGOs
engaged in “political activities.” By the end of the year, the
Duma fulﬁlled Putin’s wishes and passed a law requiring
Russian NGOs that receive foreign funds to register that fact
with the Justice Ministry, along with a statement of the ﬁnd-
ing’s purpose and reports on how the money is actually
spent. NGOs not adhering to these reporting require-
ments would be forced to close their doors. Additionally,
foreign NGOs operating in Russia would be required to re-
register with the government, a burdensome and costly
8 See also Wilson (2006) and McFaul (2007b) for perspectives on this
aspect of the Orange Revolution.
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process requiring extensive documentation. Finally, NGOs
would be required to submit to the government lists of
planned activities for the upcoming year, presumably en-
abling the Kremlin to better monitor – and counteract – any
potentially threatening activities (Orttung, 2007). As the
Kremlin grew increasingly threatened by criticisms from the
NGO community, particularly those with strong links to
western organization, Putin’s government continued to seek
increasingly assertive ways to restrict their inﬂuence and
activities in Russia. A 2008 presidential degree revoked the
tax-exempt status of foreign NGOs, particularly those op-
erating in the realms of human rights and environmental
issues.
As with other examples of Putin’s domestic “balance of
threat” authoritarianization, a substantial reaction against
the threat posed by civil society organizations occurred in
the wake of the 2011–2012 elections. In the face of pro-
tests that shook Moscow following the elections, the Duma
in 2012 passed a law requiring NGOs receiving foreign
funding to take the label of “foreign agent” while giving the
government unprecedented authority to unannounced in-
spections. Since passage, cases have been ﬁled against a large
number of NGOs deemed noncompliant (Human Rights
Watch, 2014). Hundreds of NGOs have been subjected to in-
spections by law enforcement, and 115 groups have been
classiﬁed as foreign agents by the Ministry of Justice since
June 2014 including a wide range of political and civic or-
ganizations. While the ministry has removed the label from
seven groups upon their elimination of foreign funding, at
least 14 groups have been forced to shut down (Human
Rights Watch, 2016).
In identifying the direct threat posed by foreign-funded
nongovernmental organizations and taking deliberate re-
activemeasures against such a threat, particularly when that
threat manifests itself around electoral events, Putin’s gov-
ernment has behaved in a manner consistent with
predictions of the domestic defensive realist theory as he
faces the offensive power and potentially aggressive inten-
tions of those organizations who criticize his policies and
oppose his rule.
But foreign funding is just one channel through which
NGOs and civil society more broadly threaten the Kremlin.
Even more threatening is their ability to potentially mobi-
lize signiﬁcant public action, at least within the major cities
of Moscow and St. Petersburg. This threat – of discon-
tented citizens fed up with Putin’s rule taking to the streets
– has been slower to materialize than the others dis-
cussed in the article, a fact which explains the particular
evolution of Putin’s policies on individual political action.
In fact, the mass protest by ordinary citizens was not a
signiﬁcant threat to Putin during his ﬁrst presidency (Fish,
2005). This is thanks to the high levels of what appears to
be genuine public support for his policies and leadership
duringmost of that period.9 Early examples of political dem-
onstration and other citizen activism were tolerated, with
opposition parties and groups often granted permits to hold
rallies in public spaces. As Koesel and Bunce (2012) note,
“[prior to 2011], large anti-regime protests [were] extreme-
ly rare. Post-Soviet civil society has been largely assumed
to be inactive, andwhen protests have taken place, they have
tended to be quite contained with respect to their geogra-
phy and their issue focus” (412).
This is not to say that protest was completely absent in
Russia during this period, however. In 2005 citizens took
to the streets in several Russian cities to oppose cuts in social
welfare programs implemented by Putin (Myers, 2005). Pro-
tests such as these were followed bymore explicitly political
opposition protests throughout 2006–2007, with a series of
protests known as “Dissenters’ Marches” organized by the
“Other Russia” opposition movement headed by former
prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, chess champion turned
opposition ﬁgure Garry Kasparov, and the nationalist writer
Eduard Limonov (Shevtsova, 2007, 275–277). Nonethe-
less, these protests only attracted a fairly narrow slice of the
population and the 2007–2008 electoral cycle was not char-
acterized bymajormass protests even though electoral fraud
was rampant (Koesel & Bunce, 2012; Myagkov et al., 2009).
Thus, mass protest never posed a serious threat to Putin’s
handover of power to Medvedev in 2008 and Russia did not
witness a signiﬁcant reactive crackdown against the threat
of mass mobilization following the 2008 transition. Such a
dynamic is consistent with the balance-of-threat predic-
tion of our theory: absent a major threat, there was not a
balancing reaction in response.
The same cannot be said for the 2011–2012 transition
that brought Putin back into the presidency. Signs of brewing
dissent emerged following the September 2011 announce-
ment that Putin and Medvedev would be switching places
once again, and that this arrangement had been agreed to
prior to the 2008 elections. This poorly-handled announce-
ment conﬁrmedwhatmany Russians already suspected: that
the regime’s rhetoric regarding Russia’s “sovereign democ-
racy” was simply veneer for a tightly-controlled authoritarian
process that rested entirely in Putin’s hands.
Reports of widespread electoral fraud during the Duma
elections of December 4, 2011 sparked a series of protests
in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other Russian cities such as
Novosibirsk, Ekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, and
Vladivostok.10 However, by far the largest protests took place
in Moscow throughout the winter and into the spring as the
presidential election approached. Estimates of the size of
protests vary, with some opposition ﬁgures claiming that
at their height the protests attracted 150,000 participants.
Police estimates put the number closer to 25,000 (Koesel
& Bunce, 2012, 412). Many protests, organized by opposi-
tion ﬁgures and organizations, were granted permits to
demonstrate in public. Others were unsanctioned sponta-
neous demonstrations. Nonetheless, many protests
witnessed harassment and arrest of opposition ﬁgures, cul-
minating in a major protest in Moscow that turned violent
the day before Putin was to be inaugurated in May 2008.
9 See CSPP (2014) formonthly time-series data on Putin’s approval ratings
for the entirety of his time in power.
10 See Volkov (2012) for an analysis of the demographic characteristics
of the protesters who tended to be middle-aged, well educated, predomi-
nantly male, regular internet users, and fairly well-off economically.
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Though some protests continued throughout 2012 and into
2013, the movement eventually lost its momentum and the
risk of mass protest subsided.
It is worth noting that the protests took on an explicit
anti-Putin nature, with many participants openly calling for
the ouster of Putin and his United Russia party. It is not a
stretch to say that these protests presented Putin with the
most serious threat to his political survival since coming to
power in 2000. In terms of our threat factors, the demon-
strations of 2011–2012 can be said to display elements of
aggregate power in their potential, were they to reach a crit-
ical size, to force Putin to make signiﬁcant concessions that
he otherwise would not make. They also can be under-
stood as proximate threats, as the largest demonstrations took
place at the heart of the Russian political universe in
Moscow. Recalling the principle that power is more threat-
ening the closer it is, this fact made the 2011–2012 events
especially dangerous. Finally, we cannot help but notice the
aggressive intentions of the protest movement which sought
the removal from power of the Putin–Medvedev tandem and
their United Russia power.
Given the elements of threat present in the protest move-
ment, our domestic defensive realist theory would predict
a formidable reaction to counter the threat. Putin did not
fail to deliver on this count, as Kramer (2014) noted:
The main thing Putin has feared since returning to the
presidency in 2012 is a mass protest movement that
could bring down his regime. The protests in Russia in
December 2011 provoked a brief scare in the Kremlin,
but Putin moved aggressively after early 2012 to ensure
he would never again face such a challenge. Through a
combination of selective prosecutions, vigorous crack-
downs on attempted protests, and draconian laws and
regulations, the Russian authorities ensured that would-
be protesters would be stymied at every stage.
After passing measures in 2012 that sharply increased
the penalties for violating public order during protests,
the Kremlin aggressively targeted opposition ﬁgures at
the head of the 2011–2012 demonstrations and those
who dared incite protests thereafter. Most famous were
the cases of opposition blogger and Moscow mayoral
candidate, Alexei Navalny, who was subject to repeated
arrest, as well as the members of the protest punk band
“Pussy Riot” whose arrest and trial gained international
notoriety. Not surprisingly, the political tremors set off by
the Euromaidan movement and ouster of Ukrainian pres-
ident Viktor Yanukovych in 2014 eventually reachedMoscow
and provoked a reaction in response. Under a law passed
in July 2014, repeat violators of Russia’s laws on public
order would be subject to ﬁnes of up to $30,000 USD (up
from approximately $8500). Such offenders would also be
subject to up to 5 years in prison. Tellingly, the bill’s
author dubbed the measure the “anti-Maidan” law, a clear
signal that the kinds of protests that toppled Yanukovych
would not be tolerated in Russia. Additionally, new laws –
passed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea – increased
the penalty for advocating a violation of Russia’s territori-
al integrity (such as calls to return Crimea to Ukraine) to
four years in prison (Nechepurenko, 2014).
6. Assessment and implications
Though this article has only been able to trace the broad
outlines of Putin’s authoritarianization of Russian as it has
taken place through institutional reforms, electoral manip-
ulation, policies toward media and business, and policies
toward NGOs and civil society, certain distinct patters have
emerged. The timing and patterns of these authoritarian
reforms and policies call into question the dominant nar-
rative of Vladimir Putin as an autocrat seeking to maximize
his political power and control of Russia’s political system.
Such a narrative would have predicted a much more rapid
authoritarianization of the country earlier in his rule. Were
he driven to accumulate as much political power as possi-
ble, one would have expected him to do it at the height of
his popularity in 2007, if not even earlier. In many re-
spects, Russia under a power-maximizing Putin should have
looked like Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko, who
quickly consolidated dictatorial control in Belarus within two
years of being elected president of that country. The evi-
dence shows that this was not the case – Russia’s descent
into authoritarianism has taken place gradually and has been
primarily reactive. It has taken place in response to those
actors, organizations, and forces that have presented a threat
to Putin’s political security. The overall threat posed by such
entities has depended on the degree to which they posses
domestic variants of aggregate power, offensive power, prox-
imate power, and aggressive intentions. These threats have
emerged and evolved over 14 years of Putin’s rule, and Putin
has responded accordingly to “balance” against such threats.
Rather than acting as a power maximizer, he has revealed
himself time and again to be a domestic security maxi-
mizer intent on maintaining just enough power to ensure
his survival at the top of Russia’s political pyramid.
If the observable outcome is the same – Russia under
Putin the security maximizer is still a ﬁrmly authoritarian
regime, as it would be if he were a power maximizer – does
it really matter how Russia arrived at that point? I argue
that it does matter, as the implications of the domestic
balance of threat perspective on authoritarianization in
Russia give important insights into both Russia’s past and
its future.
While Putin has reacted to threats throughout his time
as leader of Russia, those threats – and the authoritarianizing
reaction to them – have been concentrated around power
transitions and electoral events in Russia and in neighbor-
ing countries. This includes Putin’s initial efforts to reassert
Kremlin authority in Russia following Yeltsin’s resignation
(2000), which was largely characterized by actions taken
against the threats posed by strong and independent re-
gional leaders, media magnates, and business ﬁgures. These
actions, particularly those against independent media and
opposition parties, continued through the 2003–2004 elec-
toral cycle and beyond. Putin’s domestic reaction to Ukraine’s
Orange Revolution (2004–2005) was characterized by mea-
sures meant to limit the threat from NGOs – particularly
those with foreign funding – on whom Putin blamed the
Orange Revolution. The fact that the Orange Revolution
began with election protests further accounts for the Krem-
lin’s tight control and manipulation of the electoral process
heading into the 2007–2008 electoral cycle, measuresmeant
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to ensure that no similar uprising would take place in Russia.
However, Russia was beset by protests during the 2011–
2012, promoting a strong response to the threat of mass
political action in the form of increased penalties and pros-
ecution of leaders of opposition social movements. These
trends only intensiﬁed following the collapse of Viktor
Yanukovych’s authority in Ukraine in 2014, with familiar re-
actions in Russia against opposition media, civil society, and
political liberties.
This suggests that Russia has developed its own “elec-
toral model” of regime transition. However, unlike the
electoral moments that brought about the collapse of au-
thoritarian rule during the 2000s in colored revolutions,
Russia’s “electoral model” is a fundamentally conserva-
tive, counterrevolutionary force. Kramer (2014) writes,
Under Putin, Russia has been a deeply counterrevolu-
tionary power since at least 2004 (after the so-called
Orange Revolution in Ukraine) and particularly since De-
cember 2011, when mass protests erupted in Moscow
and some other Russian cities after fraudmarred the par-
liamentary elections. Having initially been caught off
guard, Putin successfully countered the protests in Russia,
but the mere fact that unrest broke out at all – and that
it quickly took on distinctly anti-Putin overtones – in-
stilled in him a counterrevolutionary obsession
The most recent electoral cycle in Russia (and previous
cycles in its neighbors) has revealed threats to Putin’s
political security and has triggered a counterbalancing
reaction. These reactions have comprised the ratcheting
action of Russia’s march toward authoritarianism with a
distinct threat-based action–reaction dynamic. There can
be little doubt that Putin has come to a similar conclusion
as ours – that threats to his security and survival are at
their peak in the lead up to elections. Especially given the
fact that the Kremlin was caught off guard by the depth of
dissent revealed in Russia in 2011–2012, this analysis
suggests that Russia’s next round of elections (Duma
elections in 2016 and presidential elections in 2018) will
be the most tightly controlled in Russia’s post-Soviet
history. Nothing will be left to chance, and the lead up to
these elections will likely witness repression of opposi-
tion parties, NGOs, independent media, and individual
liberties on a scale not seen since the Soviet era. To
borrow another theoretical construct from the IR ﬁeld,
Putin is likely to resort to preventative and preemptive
measures to forestall any signiﬁcant threat before it emerges.
Even more troubling is the likelihood of increasingly na-
tionalistic and militaristic rhetoric to motivate Russians to
once again cast a vote in favor of Putin.
The authoritarianization of Russia according to a balance-
of-threat dynamic also leads to a somewhat unexpected
conclusion about the driver of that process: Vladimir Putin
possesses a deep and enduring sense of insecurity in his rule
over Russia. As reality has become blurred with percep-
tion, the tendency to see threats emerges across all realms
of politics and society suggests, as Kramer noted above, a
man obsessed with the possibility of revolutionary upheav-
al against himself and his position as defender and
embodiment of the Russian states.
This situation suggests in a lack of stable equilibrium in
the state–society relationship in Russia. For much of the
2000s, there was assumed to be an implicit bargain between
Putin and Russian society: Putin would deliver the order,
stability, and economic prosperity that Russians had longed
for throughout the turbulent Yeltsin years, and in return they
would consent to the reduction in political freedom that was
supposedly necessary to facilitate that prosperity.11 The con-
ventional wisdom of the 2000s was that the relationship
between the Kremlin and society built on this bargain was
relatively stable and static, but this analysis suggests oth-
erwise. The relationship has always been in ﬂux on both
sides: revisionist actors, whether from the political, social,
and economic spheres have continued to emerge, and Putin
has repeatedly reacted with an ever-greater rollback of any
democratic trappings that Russia once had.
And so we are left with an uncomfortable reality: as long
as there are actors whowill be perceived as a threat to Putin’s
political security, the Master of the Kremlin will continue
to respond to those threats by turning the authoritarian
ratchet even further. All that remains under question is how
Russian society will react to this incremental but ever-
increasing pressure: will it passively allow itself to be
compressed inﬁnitely, or will it eventually shatter like a
spring that has been compressed too tightly for too long?
Putin’s fate, whether in 2018 or beyond, may rest on the
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